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ABSTRACT 
Prior research on capital structure by Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggests that the level 
of gearing in UK companies is positively related to size and tangibility, and negatively 
correlated with profitability and the level of growth opportunities. However, as argued 
by Harris and Raviv (1991), “The interpretation of results must be tempered by an 
awareness of the difficulties involved in measuring both leverage and the explanatory 
variables of interest”. In this paper we focus on the difficulties of measuring gearing, 
and the sensitivity of Rajan and Zingales’ results to variations in gearing measures. 
Based on an analysis of the capital structure of 822 UK companies, we find Rajan and 
Zingales’ results to be highly definitional-dependent. The determinants of gearing 
appear to vary significantly, depending upon which component of debt is being 
analysed. In particular, we find significant differences in the determinants of long and 
short-term forms of debt. Given that trade credit and equivalent, on average, accounts 
for more than 62 percent of total debt, the results are particularly sensitive to whether 
such debt is included in the gearing measure. We argue, therefore, that analysis of 
capital structure is incomplete without a detailed examination of all forms of corporate 
debt. 
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Capital Structure and its Determinants in the United Kingdom 
— A Decompositional Analysis 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) illustrates that the valuation of a 
company will be independent from its financial structure under certain key assumptions.  
Internal and external funds may be regarded as perfect substitutes in a world where 
capital markets function perfectly, where there are no transactions or bankruptcy costs, 
no distortionary taxation, and the productive activity of the firm is independent of its 
methods of financing.  Once these fundamental assumptions are relaxed, however, 
capital structure may become relevant.  Additionally, firms may find that there are 
restrictions to their access to external financing, and the costs of alternative forms of 
external finance may differ.  Under such market imperfections, firms will attempt to 
select levels of debt and equity in order to reach an optimal capital structure. 
  
This study attempts to extend our knowledge of capital structure and its determinants in 
listed UK companies.  In their study of capital structure in the G-7 economies, Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) find gearing in the UK to be positively related to tangibility (the 
proportion of fixed to total assets) and the size of the company (logsales), but negatively 
related to the level of profitability and the market-to-book ratio.  In this study we build 
on the UK component of the Rajan and Zingales study, by testing the sensitivity of the 
determinants of capital structure to various gearing measures and their sub-elements.  
We find that Rajan and Zingales’ results are highly dependent upon the precise 
definition of gearing being examined. Having found evidence of significant definitional 
dependence, we attempt to gain a fuller understanding of our results by further sub-
dividing the debt element of our gearing measures, in order to test the relation of each of 
the elements to our explanatory variables.  We find that the results of this analysis differ 
significantly depending upon whether we consider short or long-term debt elements.  
Consequently, our results highlight the sensitivity of the analysis to which form of debt 
is being considered. Given the predominance of short-term debt forms in corporate 
financial structure, we suggest that analyses based solely upon long-term forms of debt 
provide limited insight into the mechanisms which operate in the financial and 
corporate sectors. 
 
Empirical analysis of capital structure is fraught with difficulty, and as argued by Harris 
and Raviv (1991), “The interpretation of results must be tempered by an awareness of 
the difficulties involved in measuring both leverage and the explanatory variables of 
interest”.  In this paper we focus on the difficulties in defining gearing.  We note, 
however, that many of the potential explanatory attributes are often, at best, imperfectly 
reflected by the variables observed in corporate accounts data.  Hence Titman and 
Wessels (1988) note that the required explanatory variables may frequently be imperfect 
proxies for the desired corporate attributes, so inducing ‘errors-in-variables’ problems to 
regression analysis.  Moreover, complex attributes frequently are not reflected by a 
single, unique, explanatory variable, nor do variables reflect a single attribute.  As a 
result, the conclusions which may be derived from empirical analysis of corporate 
financial structure have the potential to become ‘definition-dependent’, as they may rely 
upon the researchers’ choice of imperfect proxy variables. 
 
This paper examines the issue of corporate financial structure and its determinants from 
three distinct perspectives.  We utilise corporate accounts data for the United Kingdom 
in an attempt to replicate the analysis of Rajan and Zingales, so permitting us to test 
their conclusions with a larger sample of firms. We conduct our analysis on data for 
1991, the same year as Rajan and Zingales. By using data from the same year, we 
ensure direct comparability with their work and limit the possibility that any differences 
in the results may be due to variations in the level of gearing over time, rather than 
indicating definitional dependence1. Secondly, given the preceding discussion, we 
implement the same analysis with alternative definitions of the dependent variable, 
gearing, in order to examine the robustness or otherwise of the results of Rajan and 
Zingales. As noted above, we then seek to explore this finding of definitional-
dependence further, and find that the determinants of gearing vary significantly 
depending on the nature of the debt sub-element being analysed. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five main sections.  Section 2 presents the 
theoretical basis for the analysis presented in this paper, predominantly based upon the 
work of Rajan and Zingales.  Section 3 then provides a detailed description of the 
database which we have assembled in order to implement the analysis, the various 
alternative dependent and independent variables definitions which we have estimated, 
and the methodology applied.  Our fourth section then details the results of this analysis, 
comparing both the various estimated gearing measures and the result of the cross-
sectional regression analysis.  As the results of our analysis of gearing reveal a 
significant degree of definitional dependence, section 5 presents a detailed 
decompositioning of the results, distinguishing between short and long-term debt and 
their sub-elements.  Finally, section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2.  THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
In their cross-sectional study of the determinants of capital structure, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) examine the extent to which, at the level of the individual firm, gearing 
may be explained by four key factors, namely, market-to-book, size, profitability and 
tangibility.  Their analysis is performed upon a firm-level sample from each of the G-7 
countries, and although the results of their regression analysis differ slightly across 
countries, they appear to uncover some fairly strong conclusions.   
 
The market-to-book ratio is used by Rajan and Zingales as a proxy for the level of 
growth opportunities available to the enterprise.  This is in common with most studies 
which tend to apply proxies, rather than valuation models to estimate growth 
opportunities (Danbolt et al. (2000)).  Rajan and Zingales suggest that, a priori, one 
would expect a negative relation between growth opportunities and the level of gearing.  
This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Mekling (1976) based 
on agency theory, and the work of Myers (1977), who argues that, due to information 
asymmetries, companies with high gearing would have a tendency to pass up positive 
NPV (net present value) investment opportunities.  Myers therefore argues that 
companies with large amounts of investment opportunities (also known as growth 
options) would tend to have low gearing ratios.     
 
Moreover, as growth opportunities do not yet provide revenue, companies may be 
reluctant to take on large amounts of contractual liabilities at this stage.  Similarly, as 
growth opportunities are largely intangible, they may provide limited collateral value or 
liquidation value (in a similar spirit to the discussion of tangibility below).  Companies 
with growth options may thus not wish to incur — nor necessarily be offered — 
additional debt financing.    
 
However, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between gearing and growth 
opportunities is rather mixed.  While Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993) and 
Barclay et al. (1995) find a negative correlation, Kester (1986) does not find any 
support for the predicted negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
gearing.  Despite this controversy, however, Rajan and Zingales (1995) uncover 
evidence of negative correlations between market-to-book and gearing for all G-7 
countries.  This is thus consistent with the hypotheses of Jensen and Mekling (1976) and 
Myers (1977), and lends weight to the notion that companies with high levels of growth 
opportunities can be expected to have low levels of gearing. 
 
Secondly, Rajan and Zingales include size (which is proxied by the natural logarithm of 
sales) in their cross-sectional analysis.  There is no clear theory to provide ex ante 
expectations as to the effect which size should have on gearing.  Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) state that: 
 
“The effect of size on equilibrium leverage is more ambiguous.  Larger 
firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size (computed 
as the logarithm of net sales) may be an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy”. 
[Rajan and Zingales (1995) p.1451]    
 
In addition, larger companies are more likely to have a credit rating and thus have 
access to non-bank debt financing, which is usually unavailable to smaller companies.  
While the prior empirical evidence with regard to the relationship between size and 
gearing is rather mixed2, Rajan and Zingales find gearing for UK companies to be 
positively related to sales, as hypothesised. 
 
Thirdly, consistent with Toy et al. (1974), Kester (1986) and Titman and Wessles 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales find profitability to be negatively related to gearing.  Given, 
however, that the analysis is effectively performed as an estimation of a reduced form, 
such a result masks the underlying demand and supply interaction which is likely to be 
taking place.  Although on the supply-side one would expect that more profitable firms 
would have better access to debt, the demand for debt may be negatively related to 
profits.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) illustrate that the inability of lenders to distinguish 
between good and bad risks ex ante prevents them from charging variable interest rates 
dependent on the actual risk.  In this event lenders are forced to increase the general cost 
of borrowing, which will tend to induce a problem of adverse selection as good risks are 
driven from the market by the high costs of borrowing.  Due to this information 
asymmetry, companies will tend to prefer internal to external financing, where 
available. 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that, due to the tax deductibility of interest 
payments, companies may prefer debt to equity.  This would suggest that highly 
profitable firms would choose to have high levels of debt in order to obtain attractive 
tax shields.  However, others such as Miller (1977) highlight the limitations of his and 
Modigliani’s 1963 arguments by additionally considering the effect of personal 
taxation.  Moreover, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that interest tax shields may 
be unimportant to companies with other tax shields, such as depreciation. An alternative 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between profitability and gearing relates to Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) pecking-order theory.  Based on asymmetric 
information, they predict that companies will prefer internal to external capital sources.  
Consequently, companies with high levels of profits will prefer to finance investments 
with retained earnings than by the raising of debt finance.  The finding of Rajan and 
Zingales of a negative relationship between gearing and profitability is consistent with 
Myers’ pecking-order theory. 
 
Consistent with the findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales’ study of capital structure in the G-7 economies produces evidence 
to suggest a positive relation between tangibility, which they define as the ratio of fixed 
to total assets, and gearing.  Following the theories of Scott (1977), Williamson (1988) 
and Harris and Raviv (1990), Rajan and Zingales suggest this may reflect the fact that 
debt may be more readily available to a firm which has high amounts of collateral upon 
which to secure debt, thus reducing agency problems3. 
 
The results of Rajan and Zingales thus provide some reasonably strong priors with 
which to judge further work.  We firstly test these priors by replicating the work of 
Rajan and Zingales for the United Kingdom in 1991.  In so doing, we assembled and 
made use of a dataset containing a sample substantially larger than that of Rajan and 
Zingales.  The richness of this dataset also permitted us to examine the sensitivity of 
their findings to definitional changes in the dependent variable, with some enlightening 
results.  Furthermore, by decomposing the individual gearing elements, we are able to 
clarify both the factors which influence these results and the extent of their influence, so 
gaining a fuller understanding of the underlying relations which determine corporate 
financial structure.  Therefore section 3 below presents a detailed description of the 
dataset, together with a discussion of the methodological rationale for our various 
dependent and independent variables and the manner in which they were calculated.   
 
 
3.  DATA  AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis was derived from the commercial database 
maintained by Datastream International Ltd.  This database contains balance sheet, 
profit and loss, and cash flow statement information for both current and extinct 
companies in a host of countries.  For the purposes of this investigation, we utilised this 
database to obtain the required variables, where available, for all non-financial 
companies in the United Kingdom.   
 
In the first instance, we took great care to define the dependent and independent 
variables to be used in our regression analysis, in order that they were consistent with 
those of Rajan and Zingales (1995).  Notably, Rajan and Zingales acknowledge that 
“the extent of leverage [gearing] — and the most relevant measure — depends on the 
objective of the analysis” (p.  1427).  However, whilst they define and calculate several 
alternative measures of gearing, their cross-sectional regression analysis is merely based 
upon one of these gearing measures.  Therefore, in order to examine the sensitivity or 
otherwise of their cross-sectional results to the definition of the gearing variable, we 
constructed their suggested alternative definitions of gearing.  Of these we define four 
gearing measures used in our analysis as: 
 
• Non-Equity Liabilities to Total Assets: At book value this gearing measure is 
defined as the ratio of total debt plus trade credit and equivalent, to total assets 
(Equation 1B).  The market value of non-equity liabilities is calculated by adjusting 
the total assets value, by subtracting the book value of equity and adding the market 
value of equity (Equation 1M). 
 
 
TA
TTCETD +  (1B) 
 
 
MVECRTA
TTCETD
+−
+  (1M) 
 
where TD refers to total debt, TTCE to trade credit and equivalent, TA to total 
assets, ECR to the book value of equity capital and reserves, and MV to the market 
value of equity. 
 
Rajan and Zingales propose that this measure acts as a proxy for the liquidation 
value of the firm.  They argue, however, that this measure may be unreasonably 
inflated, as trade credit and equivalent may be financing transactions rather than 
assets. 
 
• Debt to Total Assets: This is a simple ratio of total debt to total assets (Equation 
2B).  The market value measure is again calculated by adjusting assets in the 
denominator, by subtracting the book value of equity and adding back its market 
value (Equation 2M). 
 
 
TA
TD  (2B) 
 
 
MVECRTA
TD
+−  (2M) 
 
• Debt to Capital: This is the ratio of total debt to capital, with the capital calculated 
as total debt plus equity, including preference shares (Equation 3B).  Again, market 
value is calculated by adjusting for the market, rather than the book, value of equity 
in the denominator (Equation 3M).   
 
 
PSECRTD
TD
++  (3B) 
 
 
PSMVTD
TD
++  (3M) 
 
where PS refers to the book value of preference shares. 
 
• Adjusted Debt to Adjusted Capital: This is the measure of gearing adopted by Rajan 
and Zingales.  Adjusted debt is defined as the book value of total debt less cash and 
marketable securities.  Rajan and Zingales argue that these elements should be 
treated as excess liquidity, and therefore reducing the effective level of 
indebtedness.  Similarly the adjusted book (market) value of equity measure which 
appears in the denominator of the gearing variable is defined as the book (market) 
value of equity plus provisions and deferred taxes, less intangibles, as given in 
equations 4B (book value) and 4M (market value), below.  These adjustments are 
made, as Rajan and Zingales suggest that provisions and deferred taxation may be 
better regarded as components of equity, while intangibles may be distorted by the 
treatment of acquired goodwill. 
 
 
INTANGDTAXPROVPSECRTD
MSTCETD
−++++
−−  (4B) 
 
 
INTANGDTAXPROVPSMVTD
MSTCETD
−++++
−−  (4M) 
 
where  TCE refers to total cash and equivalent, MS to marketable securities, PROV 
to reserves and provisions, DTAX to total deferred taxation, and INTANG to the 
capitalised value of intangible assets. 
 As noted above, Rajan and Zingales suggest several additional gearing measures, and 
we were careful to test all of these in our regression analysis. While we find the key 
gearing definitions suggested by Rajan and Zingales produce well-specified 
distributions, and thus required minimal outlier elimination, some of the more esoteric 
measures produced unstable gearing values and regression results. Although further 
elimination of outliers may have rectified this situation, we wished to maintain the 
integrity of our dataset, whilst capturing the key elements of capital structure.  Hence 
we focus upon the above four key measures of gearing, which produce the most robust 
results. 
 
As discussed above, the choice of appropriate explanatory variables is potentially 
controversial (Titman and Wessels (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991)).  However, 
following Rajan and Zingales, we adopt four independent variables, defined as follows:  
 
• Market-to-book (MTB) ratio: the ratio of the book value of total assets less the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity, to the book value of total assets 
(Equation 5); 
 
TA
MVECRTAMTB +−=     (5) 
 
• Logsales: the natural logarithm of sales (Equation 6); 
 
)(SalesLnLOGSALE =      (6) 
 
• Profitability: the ratio of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA), to 
the book value of total assets (Equation 7); 
 TA
EBITDAITYPROFITABIL =     (7) 
 
• Tangibility: the ratio of the book value of depreciated fixed assets (FA) to that of 
total assets (Equation 8); 
 
TA
FAYTANGIBILIT =      (8) 
 
In an attempt to isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality which exists 
between the independent and dependent variables, Rajan and Zingales lag their 
independent variables, and hence we follow this procedure.  Moreover, Rajan and 
Zingales smooth their independent variables by averaging them over four periods — 
hence their regression analysis contains the 1991 gearing measure as the independent 
variable, with average market-to-book, logsales, profitability and tangibility for the 
period 1987-1990 as the independent variables.  However, in order to maximise our 
sample size, we instead follow Titman and Wessels (1988) in adopting three year 
averages for our right hand side variables.  In the course of this investigation we also 
performed the same regression analysis with non-averaged one year lags of the 
independent variables, with no significant change in the results.   
 
Although our assembled data appeared to be relatively clean, the largest outliers were 
eliminated by winsorising all dependent and independent variables at the one percent 
level4.  The resulting values are reported in the following section, together with the 
results of our regressions for our chosen four gearing measures. 
 
 
4.  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 4.1 Gearing in the UK 
In the first instance we attempt to replicate Rajan and Zingales’ results for gearing in the 
UK in 1991, and test the robustness of their results to changes in the definition of 
gearing.  Summary statistics for gearing in the UK are given in Table 1.  As can be seen 
from this table, the level of indebtedness of UK companies varies significantly 
depending on the measure of gearing adopted.   
 
The first debt ratio is a broad measure of gearing, referring to the ratio of total debt plus 
trade credit and equivalent, to the book value of total assets.  At book value, non-equity 
liabilities to total assets account for 49% of the book value of assets in 1991.  The level 
of gearing is, not unexpectedly, lower when a proxy for the market (rather than book) 
value of assets is applied, at 42%.  Given that book values in the UK are reported on a 
depreciated historical cost basis, these values tend to underestimate the market value of 
assets.  (This is confirmed by the market-to-book (MTB) variable, which indicates that 
the market values of the companies in the sample on average equal 1.47 times the book 
value of their total capital employed.  We discuss this further below). 
 
 ============== 
 Table 1 about here 
 ============== 
 
By contrast, the straight total debt to total asset ratio is found to be 18% at book value, 
and 17% at market value.  The large difference between the values for non-equity 
liabilities and total debt indicate that trade credit and equivalent account for a significant 
proportion of debt for listed UK companies, a point returned to in section 5 below.   
 
The ratio of total debt to capital is captured in the third gearing measure.  As total debt 
is substantially less than total liabilities, total capital is less than total assets.  
Consequently, as the denominator is smaller than for debt to total assets (the second 
gearing measure), the reported gearing measures are higher.  Based on a definition of 
gearing as debt to capital, the mean level of indebtedness of UK companies amount to 
27% (24%) of assets at book (market) value. 
 
The fourth gearing measure – adjusted debt to adjusted capital – is the measure adopted 
by Rajan and Zingales in their cross-sectional analysis of capital structure in the G-7 
economies.  As noted above, this gearing measure involves several adjustments, the 
most significant of which is the deduction of total cash and equivalent from total debt.  
Given that UK companies tend to hold fairly significant amounts of liquid assets on 
their balance sheet, it is not surprising that this measure of gearing indicates 
substantially lower levels of indebtedness (at 13% or 15% depending on whether book 
or market values are applied) than do the other gearing measures. 
 
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are also provided in Table 1.  The 
market-to-book (MTB) value at 1.47 indicates that book values do not adequately 
reflect the value of UK companies.  If book values provide fair estimates of replacement 
values or the value of assets in place, a market-to-book value substantially in excess of 
unity indicates that UK companies on average have valuable investment opportunities 
or growth options5.  As noted above, we follow Rajan and Zingales in using the natural 
logarithm of turnover as a proxy for size.  The mean of logsales (expressed in £000s) 
over the period from 1988 to 1990 indicates that the average turnover of companies in 
our sample was approximately £64m (median £54m).  The third explanatory variable is 
profitability.  Over the period from 1988 to 1990 (as applied in the regressions of 1991 
gearing ratios), the average return on assets was 16%.  Net (depreciated) fixed assets on 
average account for approximately 35% of total asset values for UK companies. 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis of 1991 gearing levels 
Rajan and Zingales estimate their regressions of market-to-book, logsales, profitability 
and tangibility against gearing, using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit model. 
They argue, however, that “The ordinary least squares (OLS) results are very similar [to 
those obtained using alternative techniques]”. Similarly we perform censored Tobit 
analysis, at various degrees of left and/or right censoring, as well as OLS estimation. 
We too find the results to be extremely robust to the estimation technique adopted. 
However, as we perform a series of regressions with different gearing measures as the 
dependent variable, we report only our OLS results: it is not clear that the different 
gearing measures should be censored at the same points, and hence we wish to facilitate 
direct comparability between the regressions based upon alternative gearing 
definitions6.  
 
The estimated regression model may be represented as: 
 
Gearingi,t  =  ß1 + ß2Market-to-Booki,t-3 +ß3Logsalei,t-3 
+ß4Profitabilityi,t-3 + ß5Tangibilityi,t-3  + εi,t (9) 
 
where i refers to the individual firms, t to the time period of the gearing measure 
(measured at the accounting year end), and t-3 to the average for the previous three 
years.  The results of our analysis are reported in table 2 below, where we include the 
results of Rajan and Zingales (in italics) for comparison, and we now consider the 
interpretation of the coefficients associated with each independent variable, in turn.    
 
 ============== 
 Table 2 about here 
============== 
 
4.2.1 Market-to-Book 
Consistent with Barclay et al. (1995) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), we find a 
significant negative relationship between gearing and the level of market-to-book when 
gearing is measured at market value7.  At book values of gearing, however, the market-
to-book regression coefficients tend to be small and not universally significant.  For 
some of the gearing measures, the results contradict the hypothesis, suggesting a 
positive relationship between the level of gearing and growth opportunities8.   
 
4.2.2 Logarithm of sales 
The study of Rajan and Zingales (1995) leads us to expect a positive correlation 
between gearing and the size of the company.  This is indeed generally what we find.  
However, while the coefficients are significantly positive for all book value measures of 
gearing, the size of the coefficients tend to be small.  At market values, logsales is not 
statistically significant.  Our results are similar to those observed by Rajan and Zingales 
for the UK, who also found logsales to be significantly positively related to book 
gearing, but not correlated with gearing measured at market values. 
 
4.2.3 Profitability 
Our results are consistent with the pecking-order theory, but contradict the tax shield 
hypothesis.  The regression coefficients for the effect of profitability on corporate 
gearing are systematically negative and highly statistically significant.  Indeed, 
profitability has generally the strongest explanatory power of the cross-sectional 
variation in UK gearing levels, regardless of the definition of gearing applied.  In their 
study of capital structure in the UK, Rajan and Zingales (1995) also find a negative 
correlation between profitability and gearing, although their coefficient at book value is 
not statistically significant. 
 
4.2.4 Tangibility 
As can be seen from table 2, our analysis provides conflicting evidence of the relation 
between gearing and tangibility, depending on the measure of gearing applied.  
Adjusted debt to adjusted capital (model 4) is equivalent to the definition of gearing 
applied by Rajan and Zingales. As can be seen from the table, this measure of gearing 
(at both book and market value) is significantly positively correlated with tangibility.  
These results are consistent with those of Rajan and Zingales, although our tangibility 
coefficients are somewhat smaller in magnitude than theirs.  Similarly, we find a 
significantly positive, although smaller, coefficient for tangibility when gearing is 
measured as the simple ratio of total debt to total assets (model 2). 
 
However, significant negative coefficients for tangibility are obtained when gearing is 
defined as non-equity liabilities to total assets (model 1).  The differences between this 
gearing measure and the remaining gearing measures appear to relate to the treatment of 
trade credit and equivalent.  In non-equity liabilities to total assets, these liabilities are 
included as part of liabilities in the numerator.  The tangibility coefficient thus changes 
sign when the gearing measure is changed from total debt to adjust for trade credit and 
equivalent. 
 
In addition, in order for the tangibility coefficient to change sign from the debt to total 
assets gearing measure to the trade-credit adjusted gearing measure (non-equity 
liabilities to total assets), trade credit and equivalent not only need to be large — in 
proportion to other forms of debt — but also to be negatively correlated to tangibility9.  
The tangibility variable measures the ratio of fixed to total assets, assets which tend to 
be long term in nature.  The reciprocal of the tangibility variable will therefore capture 
predominately current assets10.  The negative correlation between tangibility and the 
gearing measure adjusted for trade credit thus implies that trade credit and equivalent 
(which are current liabilities) are used to finance non-fixed assets (predominately 
current assets).  This is indeed what we would expect in a well functioning capital 
market with companies aiming to match maturities of assets and liabilities (Brealey and 
Myers (1996)).  As noted above, we test this perceived result by decomposing our 
gearing measures to their constituent elements, and estimating the extent to which they 
may be related to our four explanatory variables.  The results of this analysis are 
reported in the following section.   
 
 
5.  DECOMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Decomposition of corporate debt structure  
The preceding analysis suggests that it would be somewhat disingenuous to claim that 
there is one ‘universal truth’ of capital structure and its determinants.  Rather, our 
analysis illustrates that alternative definitions of gearing result in both substantially 
different absolute values, and different correlations with determining factors.  As noted 
above, casual observation suggests that these differences result from the fact that 
alternative definitions of gearing reflect differing aspects of capital structure.  In this 
light, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the nature of the ‘truth’ depends crucially 
upon the precise question being asked. 
 
Therefore, in an attempt to gain a more thorough understanding of the underlying forces 
driving our previous results, we decompose our gearing measures into their constituent 
elements, before performing regression analysis in the same manner as that reported in 
section 4 above.  Table 3 below reports the mean and median of each element, 
normalised by total assets. 
===================== 
Table 3 about here 
===================== 
 
The first row of table 3 illustrates that total liabilities on average amount to 48.59 
percent of the book value of total assets.  Total liabilities is then further sub-divided into 
total loan capital — repayable in more than one year — and total current liabilities, 
which correspond to 8.53 and 40.06 percent of total assets respectively.  If we consider 
total debt to represent long-term forms of debt and total current liabilities to represent 
short-term forms, it is thus clear that for the companies in our sample, the vast majority 
(82.45 percent) of debt finance is short-term.   
 
At the next level of sub-division, table 3 illustrates that the 17.55 percent of debt that is 
long-term is fairly evenly split between bank borrowing repayable in more than one 
year (around 56 percent of total loan capital) and securitised debt (44 percent).  By 
contrast, trade credit and equivalent is shown to be by far the largest component of 
short-term debt, comprising around 76 percent of total current liabilities.  This reliance 
on trade credit most likely reflects a rational corporate debt policy, given that other 
forms of borrowing entail significant costs.  Asymmetric information is generally 
regarded to increase the cost of bank borrowing, as the inability of lenders to distinguish 
between good and bad risks ex ante may be limited, resulting in them overcharging low 
risk customers.  Equally there are significant costs associated with issuing paper on the 
corporate bond market.  In contrast to the sub-division of long-term debt, the vast 
majority (more than 84 percent) of the 24 percent of short-term debt which is accounted 
for by short-term borrowing is in the form of borrowing from banks, with only 16 
percent occurring in terms of securitised paper.   
 
In general, we may thus conclude that the firms in our sample derive the majority of 
their finance from short-term debt forms, and that the majority of this short-term debt is 
derived in the form of trade credit and equivalent.  Total bank borrowing accounts for 
only around 27 percent of debt finance, with around 63 percent of this being short-term 
borrowing.  By contrast, although only a mere 10.64 percent of total debt is represented 
by corporate paper, the majority (around 72 percent) is long-term. 
 
5.2 Determinants of the decomposed debt structure  
Table 4 presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis conducted upon each 
of the debt elements reported in table 3.  In each case, the same three-year averaged and 
one period lagged independent variables used in the cross-sectional analysis of our four 
gearing definitions above, were regressed against each debt element11.  All dependent 
variables are measured at book value. 
 
===================== 
Table 4 about here 
===================== 
 
The first row of table 4 illustrates that each of our four independent variables —market-
to-book ratio, logsales, profitability and tangibility — are significantly correlated with 
total liabilities.  The estimated coefficients, however, do not all concur with those of our 
gearing analysis presented previously.  The coefficients for logsales and profitability are 
of the expected sign, implying that large firms tend to hold more debt — perhaps 
because they are regarded as being ‘too big to fail’ and therefore receive better debt 
access — and that more profitable firms hold less debt — as the relative cost of 
borrowing encourages use of retained earnings.  By contrast, the positive and highly 
significant coefficient of the market-to-book ratio indicates that, contrary to 
expectations, firms with growth opportunities generally hold more debt.  Moreover, we 
find a highly significant, negative correlation between tangibility and total debt; a result 
which explains our apparently contradictory findings in the gearing analysis reported 
previously in table 2, and for which our debt decomposition procedure provides a clear 
explanation. 
 
While the regression analysis of total liabilities has a relatively high explanatory power 
and produces highly significant coefficients, the analysis in table 4 clearly illustrates the 
importance of considering long and short-term debt separately.  As argued by Van der 
Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Barclay and Smith (1999) and 
Hutchinson et al. (1999), analysis of the determinants of gearing based on total 
liabilities may mask the significant differences between long-term and short-term debt.   
 
As revealed in table 4, the results vary depending on which component of long-term or 
short-term debt is being studied.  Our results clearly illustrate a significant distinction 
between long-term debt forms, with which tangibility is positively correlated, and the 
negative correlation which exists with short-term forms of debt.  Consistent with the 
results of Hutchinson et al. (1999), we find evidence in support of the maturity 
matching principle: long-term debt forms are used to finance fixed assets, while the 
reciprocal of tangibility — non-fixed assets (which consist mainly of current assets) — 
are financed by short term debt.  Consequently, it is clear that the determinants of the 
level of debt issued by UK companies vary significantly depending on which element of 
gearing is being analysed. 
 
In addition, our decomposition procedure reveals a somewhat unexpected result in 
terms of size.  Whilst size is found to be positively correlated with total liabilities and, 
at the sub-level, all long-term forms, there is mixed evidence amongst the short-term 
debt forms.  Logsales is found not to be significantly correlated with aggregate short-
term debt; however, further disaggregation reveals that while size is positively 
correlated with both trade credit and equivalent and short-term securitised debt, it is 
negatively correlated with short-term bank borrowing.  The fact that small companies 
are found to borrow short rather than long-term, may indicate that they are supply 
constrained, in that they do not possess sufficient credit rating to allow them access to 
long-term borrowing (Bank of England (1998)).  In addition, the positive and significant 
correlation between size and short-term securitised debt, suggests that small firms are 
further constrained in their debt choice, as they do not have ready access to the 
corporate bond market.   
  
Finally, we note that the positive and significant market-to-book coefficient at the level 
of total liabilities appears to be driven by the trade credit and equivalent sub-element.  
Whilst the coefficient on all the other most disaggregated debt elements is insignificant, 
the correlation between trade credit and equivalent and the market-to-book ratio is 
positive and highly significant.  Thus, ceteris paribus, a firm with strong future 
potential will prefer to finance itself with inter-enterprise credit rather than through 
more formal lines.  This is consistent with the predictions of Barclay and Smith (1999) 
who argued that, when seeking debt financing, companies with high levels of growth 
opportunities will prefer short-term to long-term debt, as well as debt with few 
restrictive covenants, in order to maintain financial flexibility. 
 
These decomposed results thus provide an explanation for our previous findings in 
section 4 above.  The benchmark Rajan and Zingales measure and our equivalent 
gearing measure ‘adjusted debt to adjusted capital’ (model 4) are predominantly based 
upon longer-term debt elements.  By contrast, the ‘non-equity liabilities to total assets’ 
measure (model 1) is adjusted with short-term debt elements, in particular trade credit, 
the largest component of debt for the average UK company.  As our decomposition 
reveals trade credit and equivalent to be significantly negatively correlated with 
tangibility, the significant negative correlation between tangibility and this gearing 
measure thus appears to stem from the adjustment for trade credit.  Similarly, the 
positive correlation between the market-to-book ratio and our first gearing measure, 
appears to stem from the short-term nature of this measure.   
 
It should be noted, however, that we do not wish to imply that longer-term gearing 
measures are inappropriate — the appropriate measure of gearing depends on the 
purpose of the analysis.  Rather we would reiterate our initial premise that the 
significant differences between gearing measures and their determining factors illustrate 
that the perceived fundamental relations in corporate financing depend crucially upon 
which element of capital structure one wishes to examine.  Nonetheless, one should be 
aware that the exclusion of short-term debt elements precludes analysis of a major 
element of gearing for the majority of UK companies.   
 
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
While in a Modigliani and Miller (1958) world capital structure may be irrelevant under 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, market imperfections — such as taxation, 
transaction costs, costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, and information asymmetry  
— may result in companies preferring certain types of financing to others.  In this paper 
we have analysed the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 822 UK 
companies, using a variety of gearing measures. 
 We applied four different measures of gearing, ranging from a broad measure of total 
liabilities to total assets, to a measure of gearing where cash and marketable securities 
are deducted from the debt measure.  Not unexpectedly, the level of gearing of UK 
companies was found to vary substantially with the definition of gearing applied. 
 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), we analysed the correlation between gearing and 
a proxy for investment opportunities (the ratio of market-to-book value of total assets), 
the size of the company (natural logarithm of sales), the profitability of the company 
(measured as EBITDA/total assets) and the tangibility (the ratio of fixed to total assets).  
However, while Rajan and Zingales identified various definitions of gearing, only one 
measure of gearing was applied in their cross-sectional analysis.  We have extended 
Rajan and Zingales’ analysis of the UK firstly by analysing the robustness of their 
conclusions to variations in the gearing measure, and secondly by decomposing the 
analysis into long and short-term debt and their sub-elements. 
 
Having applied the same gearing definition as Rajan and Zingales, based on a larger 
sample than that utilised in their analysis, our findings were very similar to theirs.  We 
found gearing to be significantly positively correlated with tangibility and logsales (for 
book values of gearing), and significantly negatively correlated with the market-to-book 
ratio and the level of profitability.  However, further analysis revealed that the results 
are highly model specific.  In particular, when the debt measure was adjusted for trade 
credit and equivalent, a significant negative correlation between gearing and tangibility 
was observed.   
 
By decomposing total liabilities into its sub-components, we uncovered significant 
differences in the determinants of long and short-term debt components.  We found that 
the various short-term elements were negatively correlated with tangibility, while the 
long-term elements demonstrated a positive correlation: thus providing evidence of 
maturity matching.  In addition, size was found to be significantly negatively correlated 
with short-term bank borrowing, and positively correlated with all long-term debt forms 
and short-term paper debt.  This may indicate that small firms in our sample have 
difficulty in obtaining long-term credit and issuing paper.  Contrary to expectations, we 
found firms with high levels of growth opportunities (as reflected by a high market-to-
book ratio) to have higher levels of debt than their counterparts with lower market-to-
book ratios.  However, this result appears to be driven entirely by trade credit and 
equivalent, and no significant market-to-book effect was found for other forms of debt.   
 
Given that trade credit and equivalent, on average, accounts for more than 62 percent of 
total liabilities, our results illustrate its significance as an element of corporate financial 
structure.  This suggests that analyses of gearing based solely upon long-term debt 
provide only part of the story, and a fuller understanding of capital structure and its 
determinants requires a detailed analysis of all forms of corporate debt. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Equation Mean Median N 
     
     
Book values     
Non-Equity Liabilities to Total Assets 1B 0.49 0.49 822 
Debt to Total Assets 2B 0.18 0.17 822 
Debt to Capital 3B 0.27 0.26 822 
Adjusted Debt to Adjusted Capital 4B 0.13 0.17 822 
     
Market values     
Non-Equity Liabilities to Total Assets 1M 0.42 0.40 822 
Debt to Total Assets 2M 0.17 0.14 822 
Debt to Capital 3M 0.24 0.20 822 
Adjusted Debt to Adjusted Capital 4M 0.15 0.12 822 
     
Explanatory variables     
Market-to-Book  1.47 1.33 822 
Logsales      11.07     10.90  822 
Profitability   0.16 0.16 822 
Tangibility  0.35 0.33 822 
     
The table displays mean and median values of gearing in the UK, as well as the mean and median 
values of the three year lagged explanatory variables.  The various gearing measures are as 
defined in equations 1to 4 in the text, where the letter B refers to gearing measures based on book 
values of asset or capital values, while M refers to market value measures of gearing.  Market-to-
Book is our chosen proxy for growth opportunities; Logsales refers to the natural logarithm of sales 
(turnover); and Profitability to the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, to total 
assets, and Tangibility refers to the ratio of fixed to total assets. 
  
 
 
Table 2 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Gearing in the UK, 1991 
 
 
Model 
 
Constant 
 
Market-to-
Book 
 
Logsales 
 
Profitability 
 
Tangibility 
 
Obs 
 
Adj R2
 
Fstat 
 
1B 
 
 0.3994*** 
 
 0.0356** 
 
 0.0169*** 
 
-0.5460*** 
 
-0.1811*** 
 
822 
 
0.1318 
 
32.17*** 
 
2B 
 
 0.1338*** 
 
-0.0031 
 
 0.0088*** 
 
-0.4014*** 
 
 0.0575** 
 
822 
 
0.0822 
 
19.39*** 
 
3B 
 
 0.1540*** 
 
 0.0169 
 
 0.0197*** 
 
-0.7423*** 
 
-0.0086 
 
822 
 
0.1126 
 
27.03*** 
 
4B 
 
 0.1673** 
 
-0.0591** 
 
 0.0102* 
 
-0.7896*** 
 
 0.1787*** 
 
822 
 
0.0906 
 
21.44*** 
 
RZB 
 
  
 
-0.13*** 
 
 0.026*** 
 
-0.34 
 
 0.41*** 
 
522 
 
0.18†
 
 
 
1M 
 
 0.6984*** 
 
-0.1148*** 
 
 0.0014 
 
-0.4942*** 
 
-0.1246*** 
 
822 
 
0.2882 
 
84.09*** 
 
2M 
 
 0.2586*** 
 
-0.0528*** 
 
 0.0011 
 
-0.3415*** 
 
 0.0801*** 
 
822 
 
0.1599 
 
40.06*** 
 
3M 
 
 0.3910*** 
 
-0.0867*** 
 
 0.0046 
 
-0.5492*** 
 
 0.0414 
 
822 
 
0.1881 
 
48.54*** 
 
4M 
 
 0.3062*** 
 
-0.0801*** 
 
-0.0006 
 
-0.5569*** 
 
 0.1506*** 
 
822 
 
0.1016 
 
24.21*** 
 
RZM 
 
 
 
-0.06** 
 
 0.01 
 
-0.47** 
 
 0.27*** 
 
544 
 
0.19†
 
 
*, **, and ***, significant at the 10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively. The gearing measures are as defined in equations 1B to 5M in the text, 
where B refers to book value measures of debt and M to market value measures of debt.  Model 1 measures non-equity liabilities to total 
assets, model 2 the ratio of total debt to total assets, model 3 debt to capital, and model 4 to adjusted debt to adjusted capital.  This is the 
gearing measure adopted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their analysis of capital structure in the G-7 economies, and their results are 
reported in the table for comparison as gearing measures RZB and RZM, with gearing measured at book and market value, respectively. 
† As Rajan and Zingales compute censored Tobit regressions, they report corresponding pseudo-R squared values, which are thus not directly 
comparable with the R squared values we report from our OLS regressions.  Notably, however, we obtain similar, and in many cases greater, 
pseudo-R squared values when performing censored Tobit regressions under our robustness checking procedure. 
 
  
Table 3 
 
Decomposed Debt Elements 1991 
 
 
Variable Mean Median N 
    
    
Total Liabilities 0.4859 0.4851 822 
 
of which:    
    
Total Loan Capital 0.0853 0.0593 822 
 
of which:    
Bank Borrowing Repayable in more than 1 Year 0.0479 0.0046 822 
 
Long-term Securitised Debt 0.0372 0.0100 822 
 
    
Total Current Liabilities 0.4006 0.3869 822 
 
of which:    
Total Trade Credit and Equivalent 0.3038 0.2906 822 
 
Borrowing Repayable in less than 1 year 0.0966 0.0660 822 
 
of which:    
Short-term Securitised Debt 0.0145 0.0045 822 
 
Bank Borrowing Less than 1 Year 0.0815 0.0517 822 
 
    
 Note: All variables normalised by total assets  
 
 
 Table 4 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Decomposed Debt Elements in the UK, 1991 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Constant     Market-to-
Book 
Logsales Profitability Tangibility Obs Adj R2 F 
         
         
TLIABS
 
         
        
         
        
        
    
    
 
      
       
       
0.3979*** 0.0351*** 0.0171*** -0.5448*** -0.1814*** 822 0.1322 32.26***
Long term debt 
 
TLTD -0.0724***  0.0010  0.0132*** -0.1703***  0.1063*** 822 0.1294   31.49*** 
 
BBGT1 -0.0045 -0.0003  0.0041*** -0.0943***  0.0395*** 822 0.0261     6.50*** 
 
LTSD -0.0769***
 
  0.0013
 
 0.0091***
 
-0.0743***
 
 0.0670*** 
 
822 0.1261   30.61*** 
  
 
 
Short term debt 
 
  
 
TCL  0.4703***  0.0342***  0.0039 -0.3745*** -0.2877*** 822 0.1673   42.23*** 
 
TTCE  0.2656***  0.0377***  0.0082*** -0.1383** -0.2400*** 822 0.1576   39.37*** 
 
BRLT1  0.2041*** -0.0039 -0.0043** -0.2310*** -0.0481*** 822 0.0597   14.04*** 
 
STSD  0.0026 -0.0009  0.0014*** -0.0209*  0.0035 822 0.0109     3.27*** 
 
BBLT1 
 
 0.2052*** -0.0018 -0.0059*** -0.2230*** -0.0570*** 822 0.0730   17.17*** 
 
*, ** and  ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  All dependent and independent variables are scaled by total 
assets. TLIABS refers to total liabilities, which is defined as the sum of total long-term debt and total current liabilities; TLTD refers 
to total long-term debt (repayable in more than one year); BBGT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in more than one year; 
LTSD refers to long term securitised debt; TCL refers to total current liabilities; TTCE refers to total trade credit and equivalent; 
BRLT1 refers to borrowing repayable in less than one year; STSD refers to short term securitised debt, and BBLT1 refers to bank 
borrowing repayable in less than one year. 
 
 NOTES 
                                                 
1As this paper focuses upon definitional dependence, and in order to achieve maximum 
comparability with Rajan and Zingales, we report results based upon 1991 data. Our 
database does, however, extend until 1997. Analyses based upon more recent data confirm 
the high degree of definitional dependence in the determinants of gearing, although the 
level of some coefficients change over time. A discussion of the time series characteristics 
of gearing in the UK is beyond the scope of this paper, and is instead discussed in Bevan 
and Danbolt (1999). 
2 For example: Crutchley and Hanson (1989) find a significant positive correlation between 
company size and gearing; Remmers et al. (1974) find no size effect; Kester (1986) 
uncovers an insignificant negative effect, and Barclay et al. (1995) find that the correlation 
between size and gearing reverses polarity, dependent upon whether the estimation is a 
pooled OLS, or a fixed-effects panel regression. 
3 It should be noted that the positive correlation between gearing and tangibility is 
inconsistent with the tax-based hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).  Based on 
their hypothesis, companies with high levels of depreciation would be expected to have low 
levels of debt.  If the proportion of fixed to total assets (i.e., tangibility) provides a 
reasonable proxy for the availability of depreciation tax shields, DeAngelo and Masulis 
would expect a negative rather than a positive correlation between tangibility and gearing. 
4 See Tukey (1962) for details. 
5 A MTB ratio in excess of unity does not unequivocally indicate that a company has 
valuable growth opportunities, as the MTB ratio will also exceed unity if the company has 
invested in positive NPV projects.  However, while MTB may not directly measure growth 
opportunities, it provides a good proxy.  Barclay and Smith (1999) find the MTB variable 
to produce results very similar to those obtained with other proxies for growth opportunities 
in cross-sectional regressions of capital structure. 
6 In addition, it should be noted that we also find our results to be robust when utilising 
White standard errors and robust regression techniques based upon Cook’s distance 
measure. 
7 As discussed in e.g., Barclay et al. (1995) and Barclay and Smith (1999), negative MTB 
coefficients with market value measures of gearing may be driven by the fact that the 
market value of the firm appears on both sides of the regressions (in the denominator of the 
gearing measure and in the numerator of the MTB ratio).  However, although analysis of 
the correlation matrix reveal negative correlations between MTB and the market value 
gearing measures, these correlation coefficients (ranging from –0.2071 to –0.4354) are not 
sufficiently large to cause colinearity problems in the regressions.  It should also be noted 
that negative correlations between MTB and gearing are also obtained for the book-value 
gearing measures (although substantially smaller, at –0.0131 to –0.2046).  The negative 
MTB regression coefficients are thus robust. 
8 See section 5.2 below for details. 
9 This is discussed further in section 5 below. 
10 We acknowledge, however, that the reciprocal of tangibility will also, where applicable, 
include some intangible assets. 
11 As before, all regression elements, other than logsales, are normalised by total assets. 
 
